These measures are smart and targeted, hitting Russia where it hurts (with maximum impact on the Russian political elite) and are well coordinated with our allies.

The sanctions are listed below.

Prohibition to provide funds or economic resources apply to:

People

• Travel ban
• Asset freeze
• Prohibition to provide funds

Entities

• Asset freeze
• Prohibition to provide funds

We are cutting Russia’s access to capital markets of the EU, increasing borrowing costs for the sanctioned entities and gradually eroding Russia’s industrial base by:

• prohibiting any form of lending to and buying of securities issued by certain Russian banks and government (including the Central Bank)
• imposing assets freezes and financing bans on a number of Russian banks
• a full prohibition of any transactions with certain Russian State-owned enterprises across different sectors - the Kremlin’s military-industrial complex
• clarifying that crypto assets fall under the scope of “transferable securities”
• extending to all official EU currencies the prohibition on the export of banknotes and on the sale of transferrable securities; all crypto-asset wallets banned, irrespective of the amount
• a ban on the rating of Russia and Russian companies by EU credit rating agencies and the provision of rating services to Russian clients
• a prohibition on providing high-value crypto asset services to Russia
• a prohibition on providing advice on trusts to wealthy Russians, making it more difficult for them to store their wealth in the EU
• a prohibition of certain business-relevant services - directly or indirectly – such as accounting, auditing, statutory audit, bookkeeping and tax consulting services, IT consultancy, legal advisory, architecture and engineering services, business and management consulting, public relations services, market research and public opinion polling services, technical testing and analysis services, and advertising services to the Russian government, as well as to legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia
• targeting the Russian elite by banning their big deposits in EU banks

We are also blocking Russia’s EU-held foreign exchange reserves by:

• agreeing to exclude key Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the world’s dominant financial messaging system
• prohibiting investing in projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund. The provision of euro-denominated banknotes to Russia has also been prohibited.

This measure stops these banks from conducting their financial transactions worldwide in a fast and efficient manner.

Banning exports of specific refining technologies, adding to the existing oil equipment ban from 2014, makes it harder and more costly for Russia to upgrade its oil refineries.

An import ban on all forms of Russian coal.

A far-reaching ban on new investment across the Russian energy sector, with limited exceptions for civil nuclear energy and the transport of certain energy products back to the EU.

A complete import ban on all Russian seaborne crude oil and petroleum products. The ban is subject to certain transition periods to allow the sector and global markets to adapt, and a temporary exemption for pipeline crude oil to ensure the phase out. This allows the EU and its partners to secure alternative supplies and minimises the impact on global oil prices.

New EU investments in the Russian mining sector will be prohibited, with the exception of certain raw materials.

The G7 and all EU Member States have set a price cap on export of Russian seaborne crude oil, fixed at a maximum price of 60 USD per barrel. It aims to reduce further Russia's revenues, keep global energy markets stable and helping to address inflation and keep energy costs stable.

• Ban on exports, sales, supply or transfer of all aircraft, aircraft parts and equipment to Russia.
• Ban on the provision of all related repair, maintenance or financial services.
• Closure of EU airspace to all Russian-owned, registered or controlled aircraft, including private jets of oligarchs.
• Restrictions on the export of maritime navigation goods and radio communication technology.
• A full ban of Russian and Belorussian freight road operations working in the EU (certain exceptions will cover essentials, such as agriculture and food products, humanitarian aid as well as energy).
• An entry ban on Russian-flagged vessels to EU ports (exceptions apply for medical, food, energy and humanitarian purposes).

Sharpening and extending export controls on dual-use goods to target sensitive sectors in Russia’s military industrial complex, and limiting Russia’s access to crucial advanced technology, such as:

• drones and software for drones
• software for encryption devices
• semiconductors and advanced electronics
• engines for drones
• chemicals that could be used for chemical weapons
• law enforcement items
• special materials and industrial machinery
• camouflage gear and riot control agents, electronic components identified in Russian weaponry

Extending the list of sanctioned entities to whom tighter restrictions apply, including companies active in military and defence areas, which are logistically and materially supporting the invasion.

The EU, in collaboration with the G7 countries and other like-minded partners, has stopped treating Russia as a Most-Favoured-Nation within the WTO framework as of 15 March 2022. This deprives Russia of key trade advantages as a WTO member.

The EU has decided to act not through an increase on import tariffs, but through a set of sanctions that comprise bans on the imports or exports of goods, notably:

• an EU import ban on all finished and semi-finished steel products
• an EU export ban on luxury goods to directly hit Russian elites
• additional import bans, including cements, rubber products, wood, spirits, liquor, high-end seafood
• further targeted export bans – worth €10 billion – in areas in which Russian is vulnerable due to its high dependency on EU supplies. This includes, for example, quantum computing, advanced semiconductors, sensitive machinery, transportation and chemicals. It also included specialist catalysts for use in the refinery industry. This will contribute to degrade Russia’s technological base and industrial capacity
• adding jet fuel and fuel additives, which may be used by the Russian army, to the existing export ban
• prohibition to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, gold, if it originates in Russia
• export bans on lower tech items used by the military such as toy/hobby drones, complex generator devices, laptop computers, cameras and lenses, radio navigational aid apparatus and apparatus for the transmission or reception of voice, images or data

• Full prohibition on the participation of Russian nationals and entities in procurement contracts in the EU.
• Restrictions on financial and non-financial support to Russian publicly owned or controlled entities under EU, Euratom and Member States programmes. No new contracts or agreements with Russian public bodies or related entities will be concluded.

On 9 September 2022, the Council agreed to fully suspend the EU's Visa Facilitation Agreement with Russia. This means that Russian citizens no longer enjoy privileged access to the EU and face a lengthier, more expensive and more difficult visa application process. Member States have wide discretion in processing short-stay visa applications from Russian citizens, and can ensure greater scrutiny of Russian nationals wanting to travel to the EU. The EU will remain open to certain categories of Russian visa applicants travelling for essential purposes, including notably family members of EU citizens, journalists, dissidents and civil society representatives.

The Commission has also presented a legislative proposal on the non-recognition of Russian passports issued in occupied regions of Ukraine. It is now for the European Parliament and Council to decide on this proposal.

The state-owned and pro-Kremlin disinformation outlets are essential and instrumental in supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. They constitute a significant and direct threat to the EU’s public order and security. This is why the EU has decided to sanction the Kremlin’s disinformation and information manipulation assets.

EUvsDisinfo: Disinformation on Ukraine
 

These measures come on top of the sanctions agreed on 23 February 2022 in relation to Donetsk and Luhansk, in particular:

• an import ban on goods from these areas
• restrictions on trade and investments related to certain economic sectors
• a prohibition to supply tourism services
• an export ban for certain goods and technologies

A package of sanctions against Belarus hitting their most important sectors and individuals supporting the Russian war effort.

Sanctions to close existing loopholes and impose further import and export restrictions on key economic sectors:

• Terminating the exemption for contracts concluded prior to the adoption of existing sanctions.
• Adding new import prohibitions on potash, wood, cement, iron and steel, and rubber products and export prohibitions on certain types of machinery, dual-use goods and technology, as well as other advanced goods and technology which might contribute to Belarus’ military, technological, defence and security development.
• targeted restrictive measures on high ranking members of Belarusian military personnel.
• SWIFT prohibitions similar to those for Russia, and further expanding the existing financial restrictions, in line with the measures already in place regarding Russia sanctions.

These sanctions were extended on 6 October 2022 to cover all the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine in the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

WTO accession process

In light of Belarus’ material support to the Russian invasion, its accession process is suspended and the EU will not participate in any accession-related work. This was confirmed in a joint statement with other like-minded WTO members on 22 March 2022. 

The Commission has set up a “Freeze and Seize Task Force” to explore the links between assets belonging to persons listed under EU sanctions and criminal activities. While investigations and prosecutions are the responsibility of Member States, the aim of the Task Force is to strengthen coordination that is needed at operational level to ensure the effective enforcement of EU sanctions across all Member States.

The Task Force is composed of the representatives of the Commission, contact points from each Member State, Eurojust and Europol. It will coordinate its work with the “Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force” set up between the G7 countries, Australia and the European Union. It will meet weekly and will remain operational for the time necessary.

To contribute to the implementation of EU restrictive measures, the Commission has proposed to add the violation of EU restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes, and to reinforce rules on asset recovery and confiscation. While the Russian aggression on Ukraine is ongoing, it is paramount that EU restrictive measures are fully implemented and the violation of those measures must not be allowed to pay off. These proposals aim to ensure that the assets of individuals and entities that violate the restrictive measures can be effectively confiscated in the future.